ASIABIZBLOG

Paulson's Legacy: Geithner:

Timothy F. Geithner, who moved closer to confirmation as Treasury secretary on Thursday, told senators that President Obama believed China was “manipulating” its currency,

Again? Since 2006, we've discussed Treasury's desire to move the RMB, but, by now, it's become a dreadful bore. [Search this page or click the Foreign Exchange category of this blog.]

Perhaps Washington believes that China has been weakened and leverage may be exerted where popular opinion supports the administration. Watch out for the push-back!

UPDATE (8 hours later):

Sure enough, the Chinese have fired back.

A Chinese ministry Saturday strongly denied Obama administration claims that China "manipulates" its currency, as the first contact between the new administration and China takes a markedly sour tone.

American lawmakers appear to have shelved the frightful idea of "nationalizing" failing banks. However, they've now settled down to discuss -- from media commentary, frantically -- a plan that mimics the experience of modern Chinese banking regulators: the creation of a "bad bank" to remove toxic assets from the system.

You may remember that the Chinese banking system was (and remains) functionally bankrupt. [This article from 2005 is worthwhile reading.] Through deft financial sleight-of-hand, a satisfactory percentage of non-performing loans (NPLs) were removed to a state-controlled holding companies (AMCs), thus allowing, among other benefits, quasi-state-owned financial institutions to list on foreign stock exchanges, sporting "acceptable" NPL ratios. But NPLs continue to rise, despite Chinese statistics (read "notorious.") to the contrary. (Whom to believe?)

PWC Hong Kong's China NPL Investor Survey 2006 -- evidently the last issued, for good reason (remember that Ernst & Young retracted its NPL report of 2006 under pressure from Chinese regulators) -- states:

The size of the China NPL market is extensive. Based on the statistics provided by the China Banking Regulatory Commission ("CBRC") as at the end of the 3rd quarter of 2006, the total number of NPLs in China's commercial banks was approximately RMB1.3 trillion (US$160 billion). However, this amount does not include the NPLs that are presently held by the AMCs -- the only NPLs from China's banking system that to our knowledge are available for sale to investors.

It is difficult to estimate the amount of unresolved NPLs within the AMCs as they generally only report the amount disposed from their initial 1999 transfer loans of RMB1,400 billion (US$170 billion), and not amounts disposed from the various subsequent transfers made in 2004/05 which, based on press reports, we estimate total approximately RMB1,225 billion (US$153 billion). Recent press reports indicate that as of the second quarter of 2006, the AMCs have resolved approximately RMB1,169 billion (US$145 billion and paren of the 1999 transfer loans. That leaves a balance of RMB231 billion (US$30 billion) of the 1999 transfer loans that still need to be resolved and an unknown number of the RMB1,225 billion (US$153 billion) subsequent transfer loans requiring disposal. Whatever way you look at it, the AMCs still have a large number of NPLs on their books that they need to resolve.

It shouldn't surprise that foreign investors are no longer in the market for NPLs:

The China NPL market for foreign investors is very quiet and we expect it to remain so for some time. While there is supply and demand, only a handful of transactions have been completed this year and foreign NPL investors are leaving the market in droves. In addition, we have not noticed any new entrants to the market.

Now, with the U.S. very likely to purchase its own children's toxic assets, perhaps it will turn to China for expertise? With similar "success?"

And who will buy these assets, if they can be called that, from the proposed "bad bank?" And for what prices: who will determine them and by what method? Mark to market? What market? what astronomical sum would it, in fact, cost? No one, it seems, really knows...

The Bad Bank (see yesterday's post) has hit a snag and may not progress past the light bulb stage. Executive regulators don't seem to know how it would work in practice.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp Chairman Sheila Bair is apparently pushing for the top post of Baddest Banker:

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair is pushing to run the operation, which would buy the toxic assets clogging banks’ balance sheets, one of the people said. Bair is arguing that her agency has expertise and could help finance the effort by issuing bonds guaranteed by the FDIC, a second person said.

Surely this sounds like Iraq all over again: a massive invasion frantically cobbled together with little planning as to the "after party."

Some have arrived at this blog after searching for news of the fire in Beijing. Here is a link to the most complete news report I've seen yet (in Chinese):

Recommended: this story -- Jailed Billionaires Show New Face of China as Markets Unravel -- rich in detail, like this:

Greaves hasn’t seen or spoken to Huang, 39, since. One morning in November, the dapper, baby-faced tycoon failed to turn up, along with his Maybach limousine, at Gome’s Beijing headquarters, where he normally worked such long hours that he had installed a double bed in the office adjacent to his own.

Well-worth reading.

Now what might this be about?

The Obama administration will propose a series of measures "over the next several months" to reform taxes on the foreign profits of multinational companies, and to crack down on abusive offshore tax shelters used by firms and wealthy individuals, Mr. Geithner said.

Reuters:

Exports in February slid 25.7 percent from a year earlier, dwarfing forecasts of a 5.0 percent fall, while imports dropped 24.1 percent, close to projections of a 25.0 percent decline.

Bloomberg's story fleshes it out a bit more. Read also Andrew Batson's article for context.

As we've written many times in the past -- echoing the research of scholars of the Chinese economy -- official Chinese statistics must be taken with a grain (make that "pillar?") of salt. Distortions due to collection methodology, the inaccuracy of reporting, the pressure of political demands, all contribute to inaccuracy.

But we all know that the manufacturing sector in China has been badly hit -- we saw the signs and posted our early presentiments back in the summer of 2008. As unreliable as the number is. I find this officially announced statistic so shocking that I'm compelled to compare it to the extraordinary upset occasioned by an event in modern Taiwanese economic history: when the New Taiwan Dollar peg to the US dollar was removed in the late 1980s.

In the space of a few months, that ratio moved from 40:1 to 25:1, shutting the doors of many businesses on the island and forcing factory owners to look for manufacturing sources elsewhere in Asia. It was -- and those who were there at the time will remember it -- a disaster of great proportions. Prices and unemployment soared, and Taiwanese, already following the trail of general diaspora throughout the world, hastened their steps away.

While a handful of Westerners have told me they do not see much change in China -- they see people continuing to purchase and go about their lives as naturally as they did before the global meltdown -- these gentlemen reside in the major urban centers and are only vaguely aware of the boiling undercurrent in rural areas, especially in the middle and southern parts of the country.

One does not see China creating within a generation -- not to mention a brief economic cycle -- a domestic market capable of absorbing sufficient volume of manufactured product to make up for the decline in exports. Exports are the engine which drives China's growth, upon which great masses of uneducated and poorly skilled people rely for a basic living. The Chinese stimulus package may provide limited employment for some building roads and fixing the rails, but never the kind of capacity that manufacturing has provided. An empty stomach and idle hands are ruinous to individual, family and country. Now that they have had a taste of a better life, Chinese will not willingly return to the life of strict social constraint and enforced poverty of the pre-1978 years.

The export statistic is, thus, a crude indicator of the social turbulence to follow.

[UPDATE (March 26, 2009): The American response here and here.]

Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川), Governor of the People's Bank of China, has proposed a supranational currency to which national currencies shall be linked and valued according to a system of "rules." Remember China's concern (panic?) over its enormous U.S. dollar reserves and investments in U.S. Treasuries [See: China's Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy] The New York Times provides a brief overview; WSJ here and here.

Pie in the sky. From WSJ:

Large, deep, and highly traded markets involving a particular currency "don't spring up spontaneously just because the Chinese central bank governor suggests this would be a good idea," says Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the University of California at Berkeley.

This is a shot over the bow. My initial reaction is that, given the statements of Treasury Secretary Geithner, this public announcement of an attack on the dominance of the US dollar indicates a worsening government-to-government relationship in economic matters between the U.S. and China.

Zhou Xiaochuan's comments in full appear below:

Reform the International Monetary System

Zhou Xiaochuan

The outbreak of the current crisis and its spillover in the world have confronted us with a long-existing but still unanswered question,i.e., what kind of international reserve currency do we need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world economic growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing the IMF? There were various institutional arrangements in an attempt to find a solution, including the Silver Standard, the Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard and the Bretton Woods system. The above question, however, as the ongoing financial crisis demonstrates, is far from being solved, and has become even more severe due to the inherent weaknesses of the current international monetary system.

Theoretically, an international reserve currency should first be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.

I. The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire world reflect the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international monetary system.

Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted with the dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and meeting other countries' demand for reserve currencies. On the one hand,the monetary authorities cannot simply focus on domestic goals without carrying out their international responsibilities; on the other hand,they cannot pursue different domestic and international objectives at the same time. They may either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing global economy for liquidity as they try to ease inflation pressures at home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets by overly stimulating domestic demand. The Triffin Dilemma, i.e., the issuing countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the value of the reserve currencies while providing liquidity to the world, still exists.

When a national currency is used in pricing primary commodities, trade settlements and is adopted as a reserve currency globally, efforts of the monetary authority issuing such a currency to address its economic imbalances by adjusting exchange rate would be made in vain, as its currency serves as a benchmark for many other currencies. While benefiting from a widely accepted reserve currency, the globalization also suffers from the flaws of such a system. The frequency and increasing intensity of financial crises following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system suggests the costs of such a system to the world may have exceeded its benefits. The price is becoming increasingly higher, not only for the users, but also for the issuers of the reserve currencies. Although crisis may not necessarily be an intended result of the issuing authorities, it is an inevitable outcome of the institutional flaws.

II. The desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies.

1. Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date. Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of 30 representative commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, which was based on the White approach, indicates that the Keynesian approach may have been more farsighted. The IMF also created the SDR in 1969, when the defects of the Bretton Woods system initially emerged, to mitigate the inherent risks sovereign reserve currencies caused. Yet, the role of the SDR has not been put into full play due to limitations on its allocation and the scope of its uses. However, it serves as the light in the tunnel for the reform of the international monetary system.

2. A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the inherent risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control the global liquidity. And when a country's currency is no longer used as the yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies, the exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in adjusting economic imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.

III. The reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with specific deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields win-win results for all.

The reestablishment of a new and widely accepted reserve currency with a stable valuation benchmark may take a long time. The creation of an international currency unit, based on the Keynesian proposal, is a bold initiative that requires extraordinary political vision and courage. In the short run, the international community, particularly the IMF, should at least recognize and face up to the risks resulting from the existing system, conduct regular monitoring and assessment and issue timely early warnings.

Special consideration should be given to giving the SDR a greater role. The SDR has the features and potential to act as a super-sovereign reserve currency. Moreover, an increase in SDR allocation would help the Fund address its resources problem and the difficulties in the voice and representation reform. Therefore, efforts should be made to push forward a SDR allocation. This will require political cooperation among member countries. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement and relevant resolution on SDR allocation proposed in 1997 should be approved as soon as possible so that members joined the Fund after 1981 could also share the benefits of the SDR. On the basis of this, considerations could be given to further increase SDR allocation.

The scope of using the SDR should be broadened, so as to enable it to fully satisfy the member countries' demand for a reserve currency.

Set up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies. Therefore, the SDR, which is now only used between governments and international institutions, could become a widely accepted means of payment in international trade and financial transactions.

Actively promote the use of the SDR in international trade, commodities pricing, investment and corporate book-keeping. This will help enhance the role of the SDR, and will effectively reduce the fluctuation of prices of assets denominated in national currencies and related risks.

Create financial assets denominated in the SDR to increase its appeal. The introduction of SDR-denominated securities, which is being studied by the IMF, will be a good start.

Further improve the valuation and allocation of the SDR. The basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies, and the GDP may also be included as a weight. The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a purely calculation-based system to a system backed by real assets, such as a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its value.

IV. Entrusting part of the member countries' reserve to the centralized management of the IMF will not only enhance the international community's ability to address the crisis and maintain the stability of the international monetary and financial system, but also significantly strengthen the role of the SDR.

1. Compared with separate management of reserves by individual countries, the centralized management of part of the global reserve by a trustworthy international institution with a reasonable return to encourage participation will be more effective in deterring speculation and stabilizing financial markets. The participating countries can also save some reserve for domestic development and economic growth. With its universal membership, its unique mandate of maintaining monetary and financial stability, and as an international "supervisor" on the macroeconomic policies of its member countries, the IMF, equipped with its expertise, is endowed with a natural advantage to act as the manager of its member countries' reserves.

2. The centralized management of its member countries' reserves by the Fund will be an effective measure to promote a greater role of the SDR as a reserve currency. To achieve this, the IMF can set up an open-ended SDR-denominated fund based on the market practice, allowing subscription and redemption in the existing reserve currencies by various investors as desired. This arrangement will not only promote the development of SDR-denominated assets, but will also partially allow management of the liquidity in the form of the existing reserve currencies. It can even lay a foundation for increasing SDR allocation to gradually replace existing reserve currencies with the SDR.

关于改革国际货币体系的思考
周小川

此次金融危机的爆发与蔓延使我们再次面对一个古老而悬而未决的问题，那就是什么样的国际储备货币才能保持全球金融稳定、促进世界经济发展。历史上的银本位、金本位、金汇兑本位、布雷顿森林体系都是解决该问题的不同制度安排，这也是国际货币基金组织（IMF）成立的宗旨之一。但此次金融危机表明，这一问题不仅远未解决，由于现行国际货币体系的内在缺陷反而愈演愈烈。

理论上讲，国际储备货币的币值首先应有一个稳定的基准和明确的发行规则以保证供给的有序；其次，其供给总量还可及时、灵活地根据需求的变化进行增减调节；第三，这种调节必须是超脱于任何一国的经济状况和利益。当前以主权信用货币作为主要国际储备货币是历史上少有的特例。此次危机再次警示我们，必须创造性地改革和完善现行国际货币体系，推动国际储备货币向着币值稳定、供应有序、总量可调的方向完善，才能从根本上维护全球经济金融稳定。

一、此次金融危机的爆发并在全球范围内迅速蔓延，反映出当前国际货币体系的内在缺陷和系统性风险

对于储备货币发行国而言，国内货币政策目标与各国对储备货币的要求经常产生矛盾。货币当局既不能忽视本国货币的国际职能而单纯考虑国内目标，又无法同时兼顾国内外的不同目标。既可能因抑制本国通胀的需要而无法充分满足全球经济不断增长的需求，也可能因过分刺激国内需求而导致全球流动性泛滥。理论上特里芬难题仍然存在，即储备货币发行国无法在为世界提供流动性的同时确保币值的稳定。

当一国货币成为全世界初级产品定价货币、贸易结算货币和储备货币后，该国对经济失衡的汇率调整是无效的，因为多数国家货币都以该国货币为参照。经济全球化既受益于一种被普遍接受的储备货币，又为发行这种货币的制度缺陷所害。从布雷顿森林体系解体后金融危机屡屡发生且愈演愈烈来看，全世界为现行货币体系付出的代价可能会超出从中的收益。不仅储备货币的使用国要付出沉重的代价，发行国也在付出日益增大的代价。危机未必是储备货币发行当局的故意，但却是制度性缺陷的必然。

二、创造一种与主权国家脱钩、并能保持币值长期稳定的国际储备货币，从而避免主权信用货币作为储备货币的内在缺陷，是国际货币体系改革的理想目标

1、超主权储备货币的主张虽然由来以久，但至今没有实质性进展。上世纪四十年代凯恩斯就曾提出采用30种有代表性的商品作为定值基础建立国际货币单位 “Bancor”的设想，遗憾的是未能实施，而其后以怀特方案为基础的布雷顿森林体系的崩溃显示凯恩斯的方案可能更有远见。早在布雷顿森林体系的缺陷暴露之初，基金组织就于1969年创设了特别提款权（下称SDR），以缓解主权货币作为储备货币的内在风险。遗憾的是由于分配机制和使用范围上的限制，SDR 的作用至今没有能够得到充分发挥。但SDR的存在为国际货币体系改革提供了一线希望。

2、超主权储备货币不仅克服了主权信用货币的内在风险，也为调节全球流动性提供了可能。由一个全球性机构管理的国际储备货币将使全球流动性的创造和调控成为可能，当一国主权货币不再做为全球贸易的尺度和参照基准时，该国汇率政策对失衡的调节效果会大大增强。这些能极大地降低未来危机发生的风险、增强危机处理的能力。

三、改革应从大处着眼，小处着手，循序渐进，寻求共赢

重建具有稳定的定值基准并为各国所接受的新储备货币可能是个长期内才能实现的目标。建立凯恩斯设想的国际货币单位更是人类的大胆设想，并需要各国政治家拿出超凡的远见和勇气。而在短期内，国际社会特别是基金组织至少应当承认并正视现行体制所造成的风险，对其不断监测、评估并及时预警。

同时还应特别考虑充分发挥SDR 的作用。SDR具有超主权储备货币的特征和潜力。同时它的扩大发行有利于基金组织克服在经费、话语权和代表权改革方面所面临的困难。因此，应当着力推动 SDR的分配。这需要各成员国政治上的积极配合，特别是应尽快通过1997年第四次章程修订及相应的SDR分配决议，以使1981年后加入的成员国也能享受到SDR的好处。在此基础上考虑进一步扩大SDR的发行。

SDR的使用范围需要拓宽，从而能真正满足各国对储备货币的要求。

●建立起SDR与其他货币之间的清算关系。改变当前SDR只能用于政府或国际组织之间国际结算的现状，使其能成为国际贸易和金融交易公认的支付手段。

●积极推动在国际贸易、大宗商品定价、投资和企业记账中使用SDR计价。不仅有利于加强SDR的作用，也能有效减少因使用主权储备货币计价而造成的资产价格波动和相关风险。

●积极推动创立SDR计值的资产，增强其吸引力。基金组织正在研究SDR计值的有价证券，如果推行将是一个好的开端。

●进一步完善SDR的定值和发行方式。SDR定值的篮子货币范围应扩大到世界主要经济大国，也可将GDP作为权重考虑因素之一。此外，为进一步提升市场对其币值的信心，SDR的发行也可从人为计算币值向有以实际资产支持的方式转变，可以考虑吸收各国现有的储备货币以作为其发行准备。

四、由基金组织集中管理成员国的部分储备，不仅有利于增强国际社会应对危机、维护国际货币金融体系稳定的能力，更是加强SDR作用的有力手段

1、由一个值得信任的国际机构将全球储备资金的一部分集中起来管理，并提供合理的回报率吸引各国参与，将比各国的分散使用、各自为战更能有效地发挥储备资金的作用，对投机和市场恐慌起到更强的威慑与稳定效果。对于参与各国而言，也有利于减少所需的储备，节省资金用于发展和增长。基金组织成员众多，同时也是全球唯一以维护货币和金融稳定为职责，并能对成员国宏观经济政策实施监督的国际机构，具备相应的专业特长，由其管理成员国储备具有天然的优势。

2、基金组织集中管理成员国储备，也将是推动SDR作为储备货币发挥更大作用的有力手段。基金组织可考虑按市场化模式形成开放式基金，将成员国以现有储备货币积累的储备集中管理，设定以SDR计值的基金单位，允许各投资者使用现有储备货币自由认购，需要时再赎回所需的储备货币，既推动了SDR 计值资产的发展，也部分实现了对现有储备货币全球流动性的调控，甚至可以作为增加SDR发行、逐步替换现有储备货币的基础。(完)

[Today's post comes to us, with our thanks, from Victor Shih, Assistant Professor of Politics at Northwestern University in the U.S., and blogger at Elite Chinese Politics and Political Economy. Victor is the author of the very fine, Factions and Finance in China, now available in paperback.]

Victor Shih | Apr 23, 2009

I have been getting a wave of bullish sell side reports about how the stimulus program launched late last year is having an unexpectedly good impact on leading indicators in China. Before we draw quick conclusions about how rosy everything will be, let's step back and examine what these figures are actually telling us. In essence, most of the benefits of pumping 5 trillion into the economy are temporary. When this pace of lending slows, many benefits will reverse into major problems.

First of all, I am more or less repeating some points that Mike Pettis raised in earlier notes. Also, unlike many sell side analysts, Stephen Green at Standard Chartered has issued several reports that give a more comprehensive view. Let's look at the latest figures. In conjunction with the stimulus program, the banks issued nearly 5 trillion RMB in new loans in the first quarter, a historically high level. Because there was basically no share issuance or new corporate bond issuance, the 5 trillion from the banks was really the main engine for 1Q 2009. The 5 trillion is almost the size of the US fiscal stimulus package and basically 1/6 of China's 2008 GDP. As far as I know, this is the largest monetary easing in this period of time as a share of a country's GDP (that didn't go into writing off bad debt, that is). Impressive indeed, but what did China get in return?

1. To be sure, fixed asset investment grew by 25+%, which was one of the intended effects of monetary easing of this magnitude.
2. Official PMI, which mainly reflects sentiment among SOEs or state corporation, went back into positive territory, but private sector PMI was still in negative territory at the end of March.
3. There has been a pretty impressive stock market rebound in the A share.
4. The housing market is showing some sign of life after a long winter. Sales in many major cities are going up significantly, even driving up prices in some cases.

So far so good, BUT...

When we look at figures for non-investment economic activities, things do not look good at all. In fact, it is down right disappointing after pumping 5 trillion into the economy.

1. First of all, export and FDI continue to fall at a pretty fast pace, which can't be helped.
2. More alarming, inventory for many industrial goods continue to build UP! According to a recent note by Stephen Green's team, refined oil inventory is up over 35% YoY as of the end of February.
3. Coal inventory seems to have gone down, but that's because many coal mines have ceased to operate. The 21st Century Business Herald reported that 50-70% of mines are "resting" for the moment. Iron ore mines are facing the same problem as international iron ore now costs less than domestic ore.
4. Electricity usage continues to be in negative territory.

Steel consumption has picked up somewhat from a collapse late last year. However, I think the problem there is continual over-capacity. The central government didn't want any major steel firms to go under, so they are spending billions to "merge" a bunch of steel firms. For example, Bao Steel based in Shanghai will buy up several steel producers in the Jiangsu/Zhejiang area. This maintains the over-capacity in the sector and will put upward pressure on inventory.

In electricity generation, there is rumor of CIC2, a mega company that will buy up distressed electricity producers and coal mines from across China, boosting the on-going consolidation financed by bank loans. In the airline industry, billions have been injected into airlines to keep them afloat amidst disastrous bets on world oil prices.

There is then the widely cited figures of 12% increase in urban income at the end of 2008 and increase in car sales in first quarter. In the first instance, I have no idea how the income figures were produced, but they almost always miss migrant workers, who are also urban residents. On the car sales, China Economist already points to a recent FT article which questions whether sales of minivans will help car company profitability. Finally, employment, which supposedly was the main point of the stimulus, was only marginally improved by the 5 trillion. Most large projects haven't gotten going yet as land still needs to be procured. The biggest employment impact was that the 5 trillion prevented the mass bankruptcy of hundreds and perhaps thousands of firms. However, some firms are staying alive by laying off or furloughing workers, like the coal mines.

So, really, when it comes down to it, the 5 trillion bought:

1. some psychological relief
2. some more sales of real estate, thus delaying the bankruptcies of many developers
3. an upbeat stock market, for a while
4. prevented the bankruptcy of numerous state firms, especially in the airline, coal, electricity, and steel sector

The most alarming thing is that these "positive" effects of pumping money into the economy lasts only as long as the money keeps flowing. If for whatever reason, the central government decides to slow down the pace of lending (and there are signs they are thinking of doing so), ALL of the above benefits will collapse relatively quickly. Imagine; if the flow of funds slows significantly, the psychological relief will disappear quickly, as will short-term loans to developers; the upbeat market sentiment will follow as speculative funds withdraw suddenly from the market. SOEs, which are building UP their capacity and inventory as we speak, will face growing losses from depreciation and deflationary pressure on output. Without free flow of bank loans, they will begin to default on their previous loans. Speculative demand for real estate will also collapse, given that inventory is expected to reach over 1 billion sqmtr some time in 2009 (again citing SCB report by Green et al.).

What does this mean? The central government cannot stop or even significantly slow this pace of lending until export picks up in a significant way, else the bubble will burst. This is a race against time. At some point, this pace of lending will lead to a serious NPL problem or inflation, or both. If by that point, export and domestic household consumption remain anemic, I am not sure what options the central government will have.

The New York Times reports:

Exports from mainland China slumped 22.6 percent in April from a year earlier, official statistics showed — a fall that was not only larger than economists had expected but also bigger than that in March, when overseas shipments declined 17.1 percent.

Quotes like those below make for great reading. The proclamations of friendship between China and African nations, common in the 1960s and 70s, based upon on a common penury and "revolutionary ideals," have long since vanished, replaced by mountains of cash.

China's cynical new version of imperialism in Africa is a wicked enterprise.

There are persistent rumours, which cropped up in almost every conversation I had in Zambia, that many of the imported Chinese workforce are convicted criminals whom China wants to offload in Africa. I was unable to confirm this but, given China's enormous gulag and the harshness of life for many migrant workers, it is certainly not impossible.

The limitation of the article -- not a weakness -- is the insistence that the writer's personal experience is repeated throughout Chinese business communities in Zambia and Africa. Nonetheless, I found many of the writer's assertions to be plausible. Confirmation of this story is essential. First-hand accounts would be extremely welcome, especially from Chinese who've lived and worked in these colonies. Readers aware of other such articles are more than welcome to pass those stories on to me.

If any of this is true, the writer is himself quite an interesting individual.

China has quarantined 107 British students for swine flu precautions. Quarantine of foreigners for suspected swine flu has reached surprising proportions.

U.S. Embassy Spokeswoman Susan Stevenson said the embassy didn't have a total number of Americans quarantined in China, but said they were "aware of several cases at the moment." Ms. Stevenson said about 1,800 Americans had been quarantined in China since the swine-flu measures began in early May; 200 people tested positive for swine flu.

One wonders the extent of quarantine of Chinese citizens.

More than a thousand steel workers in China's northeast staged an at-times violent protest against the planned takeover of their state-run employer and a group of them killed a top executive at the private company that was to acquire it, Chinese state-run media reported.

The article is here.

Martin Hutchinson's piece on the Chinese economy bubble is worth your time:

Savers are not permitted to take money out of China, and their huge savings prop up an overvalued stock market and a bond market that is comparable in size to the freely flowing international bond market. Private sector companies are either youthful fly-by-night operations or dubiously privatized state behemoths. Prices are still largely administered, and investment flows mostly to the politically connected rather than to the economically attractive. Education is relatively poor outside the main population centers, and land ownership is still restricted.

China is thus much more like pre-1941 Japan than post-1950 Japan and its economic inefficiencies are correspondingly greater. Because of those economic inefficiencies, the chances remain high of a meltdown far before China has achieved Western living standards.

A spontaneous demonstration in Guangzhou the likes of which have not been seen in China for perhaps 75 years: all foreigners. But this time, a twist: they are all black.

Trapped in a police raid on illegal immigrants that afternoon, Okoro chose to leap from the second floor of a shopping mall rather than be arrested.

He landed on his head.

Now, as he lay unconscious on the station's doorstep, angry protestors fanned out into the street – blocking traffic, ripping up plants, waving tree limbs and denouncing the police.

NY Times:

A World Trade Organization panel ruled on Wednesday that China had violated its international free trade rules by limiting imports of books and movies,

WTO Findings and Conclusions here. (Beware: although written in what appears to be English, it is generally impervious to understanding by those with graduate school education. You may need to hire a specialist.)

UPDATE: China to appeal.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced today that

Investment declined 35.7 percent from a year earlier to $5.36 billion, the Commerce Ministry said at a briefing in Beijing today. That compared with a 6.76 percent drop in June.

Creatively spinning this data -- which, as with most Chinese statistics, likely represent an optimistic representation -- Commerce Ministry spokesman and advance man for the investment roadshow, Yao Jian, said:

“China’s FDI is still healthy compared to the global slump in investments...We can say that China is one of the most attractive places for investments.”

[Editor's Note: Steel is a big deal in China. The World Steel Association has noted:

The case has generated a great deal of discussion among attorneys involved with China. The following post I found especially interesting and worthwhile reading. Today's post has been graciously provided by Vivienne Bath, Senior Lecturer and Director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law, University of Sydney. Ms. Bath writes that the opinions expressed are entirely her own and do not represent the views of Sydney University.]

Comments on the Stern Hu/Rio Tinto Case

The case of Stern Hu and his colleagues continues to present a number of difficult issues. The first is that when Stern Hu and his colleagues were arrested, the allegation seemed to be that they were being investigated for theft of state secrets – an offence which is not clearly defined and is potentially very far-reaching – even though the information in question appeared to be commercial information of state-owned enterprises. Given that the Chinese Ambassador to Australia spent considerable time making speeches when the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal was under consideration saying that state-owned does not mean state run and the primary aim of enterprises like Chinalco is to make money, the state secrets allegation appeared to confirm much of what the Australian Opposition and the Australian press had been saying about the proposed investment. If the original allegation had been commercial bribery and infringement on business secrets, there would undoubtedly have been a discussion on why Rio’s employees were targeted, but nothing like the fuss that the state secrets allegation created.

It should be noted that most prosecutions for bribery in China concentrate on the officials or executives who are bribed rather than the companies or people who did the bribing. Most cases involving the “bribers” have been brought by the US authorities (although Australia has its own version of FCPA, no prosecutions have ever been brought under the legislation).

It is also not clear why it is only the employees have been targeted if the allegation is commercial bribery. Why not Rio itself? If bribes were paid, where did the money come from and for whose benefit were they paid?

Another question is whether the fact that the employees are all either Chinese or, in Stern Hu’s case, formerly Chinese makes a difference to their position. James Peng, the Australian who was tried and put in goal for 6 years in China over what appeared to be primarily a commercial dispute, was also formerly a Chinese national. Chinese nationals (and former nationals) do tend to have much better access to sources in China and to be able to work with their Chinese contacts in a way that non-Chinese Australians are generally not able to do, but that does not necessarily mean that they are more inclined to act dishonestly. It does seem, however, that they are more exposed.

The last point is the motivation for the charges and the question of what message, if any, is being sent – and to whom. It appears that the Stern Hu case is probably related to the iron ore negotiations, particularly since, according to reports, various executives in Chinese steel companies have also been detained. It comes at the same time as other significant developments in the generally friendly Australia-China relationship, however.

On the one hand, stresses in the Australia-China relationship include the failure of the Chinalco-Rio deal, which was due to the Rio shareholders rather than the Australian government. The Australian government (perhaps fortunately for it) was never required to make a ruling, although this may not be believed in China, where the role of foreign governments in business is often over-estimated. In addition, from the Australian point of view, the relationship has not been at all assisted by the efforts of the Chinese Embassy and the Consulate to try to induce the government to refuse a visa to Radiya Kadeer (who actually has close relatives in Australia and has made several visits in the past) and on the Melbourne Film Festival and the National Press Club not to show a documentary about her. On the other hand, an announcement has just been made of a 20 year LNG gas purchase contract between PetroChina (which is, of course, also state-owned) and Exxon for the purchase of gas from the Gorgon field off Western Australia – reportedly the largest trade deal ever signed involving Australia. If the message in the case of Stern Hu and his colleagues is to the Australian government, therefore, it is completely unclear what it is. If it is directed at Rio Tinto and the Chinese steel companies, the ramifications have been considerably broader than intended.

More pie-in-the-sky dreams about a consumer economy in China. Note this paragraph, buried in the article:

It remains unclear whether the Chinese have abandoned their traditional caution [to spend]. "Over the past decade or so, the growth of China's household consumption has been outpaced by fixed investment growth and exports, and consumption as a percentage of GDP is low and has been on the decline," said Morgan Stanley analysts Qing Wang and Steven Zhang in a report last month.

The topic is a long-standing Western fantasy about which I have written often over the past 10 years on this blog and will not spend any more time on.

Getting China to spend rather than save turns out to be harder than it sounds.

I have been tooting this horn for a decade, with few other Western watchers in agreement, until this rather tepid, but ultimately concurring, WSJ piece. China will not become the spendthrift the US wishes it to become. Of course, Chinese have known what Westerners, especially Americans, haven't dared to assume.

I've heard this same argument, in its various iterations, from so many people over the past 15 years that I'm not surprised to see James Chanos, a well-known short seller, join the club, even at this late date.

As most of the world bets on China to help lift the global economy out of recession, Mr. Chanos is warning that China’s hyperstimulated economy is headed for a crash, rather than the sustained boom that most economists predict. Its surging real estate sector, buoyed by a flood of speculative capital, looks like “Dubai times 1,000 — or worse,” he frets. He even suspects that Beijing is cooking its books, faking, among other things, its eye-popping growth rates of more than 8 percent.

Notwithstanding his record of contrarian success, Mr. Chanos is but another Westerner to see past the smoke and mirrors to conclude that the end is near. (If you have been reading this blog over the past eight years of its existence, you will have read of many such prognostications.) If one could only find Chinese who agree.

[UPDATE (Jan. 11, 2010): Even more - yawn! - bubble talk. I don't mean this. I mean this.]

Why do they call it China's "empty city?"

I write this to satisfy the curiousity of those who may not see a quotation referenced in an Asiabizblog post.

The New York Times has removed or revised two quotations from an article it published on January 13, originally titled, "China's Exit Threatens China's Internet," by David Barboza, et al. The revised article, running at the same URL as the original, is entitled, "Baidu’s Gain from Departure Could Be China’s Loss." Among the quotations removed is that of Anne Stevenson Yang, whom I quoted in yesterday's post. (See post below.) Yes, that quote was there and is now gone. Along with this one: "It's the epitaph for US online involvement here."

In addition, the following quote from the original story was partially revised.

“Baidu keeps a great relationship with the government,” says Hong Bo, a consultant at 5G, a Beijing-based consulting firm. “If the government wants something removed it will do it immediately. On the other hand, everything with Google has to go through its headquarters.”

The revised article curiously allows the writer to ventriloquize the first sentence:

Baidu’s strong relationship with the government contributed to its rise. “If the government wants something removed, it will do it immediately,” said Hong Bo, a consultant with 5G, a Beijing consultancy. “On the other hand, everything with Google has to go through its headquarters.”

Other than these changes, the articles appear similar. So, why were any changes made? Why were quotes dropped?

[H/T to a friend.]

Sources not named by Reuters allege employee collusion:

Google (GOOG.O) is investigating whether one or more employees may have helped facilitate a cyber-attack from China that the U.S search giant said it was a victim of in mid-December, two sources told Reuters on Monday.

Extraordinary -- unnamed sources. Unnamed and yet virtually identified?

The sources, who are familiar with the situation, told Reuters that the attack, which targeted people who have access to specific parts of Google networks, may have been facilitated by people working in Google China's office.

In other words, other Google employees with an ax to grind? American executives who are sick and tired of surveillance? The PR department?

Furthermore, despite Google's claim to cease filtering, it is not evident that the company has made any change in Web search filtering.

This is a strange game of cat and mouse. We know what the cat wishes to do. What exactly is the mouse doing?

Google has announced a delay in China of the launch of mobile phones using its Android software.

One must question this move as simply more Google shadow boxing. Despite its threat to remove web filtering, Google does not appear to have done so. Similarly, a postponement is simply that. The delay of a marketing expense will have no effect on top-level cadres, other than to demonstrate weakness of resolve. Why?

Because Google can't extricate itself from China. Think of the likely effect "leaving China" on the introduction into world markets of the Nexus, the new Google phone. After all, the product itself will be manufactured in China (where else?). Apple must be jumping for joy.

(Even were Google to leave, Chinese authorities would still welcome revenues resulting from the contract manufacturing of the Nexus, but the threat of being cut off from supply would remain.)

If Google's Board believes its announcement serves to generate public pressure from foreign investors, I think it is much mistaken. Could they suffer from grandiose notions of its importance in Chinese affairs? China can do very well without Google. After all, China has its own Google: Baidu, modeled in its image.

Google is vulnerable, and in China the strong prey upon the weak without mercy. American manufacturers and even end-users, including the United States armed forces, now plainly see how vulnerable they have become to the agglomeration of manufacturing resources in China, the purported need to sell in China and the compromises that must be made to do so.

Breaking news at WSJ:

Google CEO Schmidt at Davos: 'We like what China is doing in terms of growth ... we just don't like censorship. We hope that will change and we can apply some pressure to make things better for the Chinese people.

Uh oh.

This is worse than merely shooting oneself in the foot, is it not? Direct foreign criticism of Chinese "internal affairs" declaimed to the world's elite political leadership.

From the NY Times:

“Here’s a list of the people who’ve been infected with my Trojan horse,” he says, working from a dingy apartment on the outskirts of this city in central China. “They don’t even know what’s happened.”

Worthwhile reading.

Vice Commerce Minister Zhong Shan:

"Water doesn't boil if it is heated to 99 degree Celsius. But it will boil if it is heated by one more degree," he said. Likewise, "a further rise in the yuan by a very small magnitude might cause fundamental changes" to exporters in China, he said.

八九不離十啦！ [Translation: Six of one, half a dozen of the other.]

The Minister's statement represents a curious tactic -- we may see the Vice Minister removed for it (fingers crossed) -- as close to an official proclamation that the "boiling point" of the Chinese economy is at hand. One should note that an egg will still hard-boil at 99°C.

The remainder of the interview is typical clap-trap worth reading for sheer delight.

One heard very recently of Chinese confidence in the Euro, as opposed to the US dollar, and the not-so subtle threat to re-allocate China's foreign reserve holdings from more heavily US-weighted to somewhat less.

This rhetoric appears to have turned against its purveyors. Chinese exports to the EU have suffered.

This quote, reminding me of Chinese attempts to find holes in shipping and L/C documentation to avoid payment on goods when currency movements made orders suddenly unprofitable, sounds like the shoe is now on the other foot:

“We have been receiving calls from some European clients who signed contracts with us earlier this month, and they all want to cancel their orders, since the depreciation of the euro has eroded all their margins and then some,” said Elvin Xu, the sales manager of Guangdong Ouyi Electrical Appliance in Zhongshan, China, which makes gas stoves, heaters and water heaters. “They say they cannot increase the prices at their end to their customers, given intense competition in their marketplace.”

In addition, in March, Chinese purchases of US long-term securities "rose 2 percent to $895.2 billion, the first increase since last September."

Weakness is evident in the Chinese position. So, where is Secretary Geithner and what of the administration's reported push to free the reins upon the RMB?

Over the past 8+ years, this blog has welcomed readers from the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Commerce and numerous Virginia-based servers the origin of which one can only guess. Perhaps policymakers even read what is written here -- I do not flatter myself.

But when I see, the day after a pointed question asking when Secretary Geithner will "press China on trade," an article entitled, "U.S. to Press China on Trade Geithner Will Seek Freer Markets in Beijing Talks; Euro Crisis Damps Yuan Issue," it is almost as if this maverick voice in the wilderness has been heard.

Alas, not. A search of "geithner press china trade" returns articles delineating administration plans to influence China from late 2008, at which time Mr. Geithner was installed as Secretary of the Treasury. I do not even wish to search for the names of other Secretaries in conjunction with "press china trade," or any confluence of similar words. That would be a sheer waste of time. We all know how "pressing" this issue has been for this (and other) administrations.

[For those not born and raised in the U.S.: Maverick, in the link above, is a cartoon character, the silent, ever-nodding in agreement sidekick to Yosemite Sam. A lovable character, co-starring in "Oily Hare," one of my personal favs. However, a maverick is really an unbranded animal, free to roam the range, from which the term has come to mean "a free-speaker" in the best American sense.

Here. With some observations and a video of what may be replacement workers for remaining strikers crossing the picketline here. Interesting comments under the video here.

I've not been blogging recently, so I'm going to suggest long-time readers make a point of visiting this blog: China Hush.

Small companies, generally speaking, should not source product in China. Aside from logistical difficulties, they don't have the volume orders to command signficantly low price points nor even the quality control larger buyers can insist upon (and must fight to ensure is implemented). This Wired article on the subject is worth reading.

Rising labor costs do not present a major problem to manufacturers in China, even as they have risen over the past decade, because they comprise a minor percentage of product cost. The government-led tax incentives are the major drivers -- and the drooling (over an undersupplied consumer market not even nearly the size of the EU, but with the dreamlike possibility of "limitless growth "). Manufacturers may complain all they like, but quality concerns and theft of intellectual property have not moved them en masse out of China because they are making money in the short term.

Surely, the return of some manufacturing capacity to the US is not presently a trend of great significance. When Walmart starts sourcing its clothing in the mills of the Carolinas or when Pep Boys buy OEM replacement auto parts in Michigan -- that will be the sign of great change. And nothing like that is happening or looks like it will.